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In this paper a game theoretic model is employed to analyze the 
relationship between strategic location decision of firms in the supply 
chain considering the role of horizontal and vertical knowledge 
spillovers, and numerical approach is applied to characterize the 
equilibria of the considered multi-stage game. Geographical 
concentration or isolation as equilibrium outcome is determined 
based on our different parameterizations and two scenarios each 
consists of two separated cases, which we establish according to the 
location of our agents. In the first scenario both suppliers are 
supposed to be located in different regions while in the second one 
they act in a same region. In addition, first case of each scenario 
considers geographical isolation of two producers whereas second 
case investigates the geographical concentration. Furthermore, the 
effect of different technological level of our agents on their final 
location decision is investigated.  
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1. Introduction  
 
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than 
distant things.” (Waldo Tobler) The importance of location decision of firms and its 
consequent effect on knowledge spillovers and innovation intensity of even whole 
industry has been emphasized in recent studies. “Innovation has become the 
defining challenge of global competitiveness; to manage it well, companies must 
harness the power of location in creating and commercializing new ideas”. (Porter 
and Stern, 2001, pp. 28) Clusters as geographical concentration of interconnected 
companies and institutions in a particular filed (See Porter 1998), is an interesting 
concept appears in economic geography and innovation literature. “What happens 
inside companies is important, but clusters reveal that the immediate business 
environment outside companies plays a vital role as well. This role of location has 
been long overlooked, despite striking evidence that innovation and competitive 
success in so many fields are geographically concentrated – whether it’s 
entertainment in Hollywood, finance on Wall Street or consumer electronics in 
Japan”. (Porter, 1998, pp. 78)  
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Furthermore recent empirical evidence shows that cost considerations have obtained 
significant attention relative to market entry and are concerned recently in many 
cases the main factor affecting firms‟ location decisions. (See Kinkel and Lay, 2004) 
Beside factor costs and entry into new markets, some other relevant arguments 
including availability of skilled labor, the local institutional environment, the size or 
economic importance of a region in relation to the expected intensity of competition 
or the possibility to improve production due to technological spillovers from other 
firms or research institute in the local proximity can affect the location decision of 
firms.  
 
In this paper a different viewpoint to location decision of firms in the presence of 
knowledge spillovers is applied. Actually strategic location decision of producers with 
respect to technological activities of their respected suppliers in a framework of 
supply chain is examined, which has been studied rarely in literatures. (See Ishii, 
2004) Indeed the role of vertical knowledge spillovers between producer and supplier 
via supply chain is highlighted and distinguished from horizontal knowledge 
spillovers which occur between two firms from same stream of a market. Here we 
are eager to respond the question that under which circumstances vertical 
knowledge spillovers via supply chain lead to geographical concentration.  
 
In this research we try to bind economic geography concepts like isolation or 
concentration of firms with knowledge spillover context which has origin in R&D 
literatures which has not done independently and numerically in previous literature. 
For this purpose a three-stage game theoretic model is established as in the first 
stage, our economic agents including two suppliers and their respected producers 
locate in two geographically different regions based on the framework of our model, 
then in the second stage they invest on R&D activities in the form of marginal cost 
reduction and finally in the third stage they compete on the amount of output they will 
produce strategically via Cournot market structure.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several studies have been done so far in the appreciation of geographical 
concentration e.g. Krugman (1991) has mentioned three reasons for localization: 
first, the concentration of several firms in a single location offers a pooled market for 
workers with industry-specific skills, ensuring both a lower probability of 
unemployment and a lower probability of labor shortage; Second, localized industries 
can support the production of no tradable specialized inputs and third informational 
spillovers can give clustered firms a better production function than isolated 
producers. 
 
Almazan, De Motta and Titman (2007) introduced a model which exhibits that the 
choice of locating within rather than away from industry clusters is influenced by the 
extent to which training costs are borne by firm versus employees. Moreover, the 
uncertainty about future productivity shocks and the ability of firms to modify the 
scale of their operations also influence location choice. 
 
Moreover, several economists have investigated different aspects of investment on 
R&D activities e.g. Poyago-Theotoky (1991) established her static game theoretic 
model based on empirical evidence that the number of cooperative agreements in 
R&D has increased since 1980s. In her viewpoint R&D cooperation not only leads 
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firm to engage in more R&D and thus produce more R&D output (in the form of cost 
reduction) but, in addition, has also the beneficial effect of making firms fully disclose 
their information. This kind of R&D cooperation is seen to improve own firm 
profitability and social welfare as it involves lower prices and higher total output 
relative to non-cooperation. She considered knowledge spillovers endogenously in 
her model. 
 
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) endogenized technological spillovers with a new 
approach via static game theoretic model  in which firms compete for knowledge by 
making wage offers to each other‟s R&D employees. They showed that incentives to 
acquire spillovers and incentives to prevent spillovers are stronger under quantity 
competition than under price competition.  
 
D‟Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) investigated the effect of cooperation level of 
firms on social welfare considering duopoly market in the presence of knowledge 
spillovers. They considered two types of agreements in which in the first one 
companies share basic information and efforts in the R&D stage but remain rival in 
the marketplace while in the second case, extended collusion between partners, 
creating common policies at the product level.  
 
Dawid and Wersching (2007) showed that because of competition effects, 
technological spillovers as a technological coordination device negatively affect the 
profits of cluster firms. Moreover Dawid, Greiner and Zou (2010) established a 
dynamic model of a firm which is deciding whether to outsource parts of its 
production to a less developed economy where wages and the level of technology 
are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with spillovers to 
foreign potential competitors which increase productivity of those firms over time and 
make them stronger competitor on the common market. 
 
Considering all above mentioned outstanding studies in this filed, this paper focuses 
on the effects of vertical knowledge spillover between a supplier and its respected 
producer -which may appear in the form of some R&D cooperation agreements in 
order to eliminate duplication of R&D efforts- plus horizontal knowledge spillover 
between two firms of the same stream of the market -which compete with each other 
in the same marketplace- on the location decision of these agents which may result 
geographical concentration or isolation. It is often pointed out in the literature that the 
close relationships between final-good producer and its respected supplier are 
important for successful innovation efforts. (See von Hippel 1988; Riggs and von 
Hippel, 1994) 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, theoretical model and 
methodology is presented which will be analyzed in section 3 utilizing numerical 
approach. The last section concludes and points out possible extensions of the 
model as well as research limitations. 
 
3. Model and Methodology 
 
Consider an economy including two separated geographical regions iR , 1,2i   but 
treated as one market. Four firms consisting of two suppliers and two producers from 
the same industry collaborate via their supply chain in the form that iS  is a supplier 
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of just
iP  with 1,2i  . Without loss of generality we assume that upstream suppliers iS
( 1,2i  ) produce homogeneous intermediate goods and downstream producers iP (
1,2i  ) produce homogeneous final goods respectively which one unit of 
intermediate good is required to produce exactly one unit of final good. We 
investigate two scenarios which in the first one both suppliers are located in the 
same region, say
1R , and in the other one suppliers act in different regions.  
 
We utilize a three-stage static game with perfect information: In the first stage, firms 
locate in two regions iR  ( 1,2i  ) based on our abovementioned scenarios about 
suppliers; in the second stage, firms choose their cost-reducing R&D expenditure 
(Innovation level) iX  for producers and iY  for suppliers ( 1,2i  ); in the third stage 
vertical and horizontal knowledge spillovers exogenously take place given the 
formation of firms in two regions as well as their innovation efforts and firms compete 
on standard Cournot market structure to choose the amount of output they will 
produce strategically. 
 
Figure 2.1 
 
 
 
                t=1                                                                  t=2                                                            t=3 
         Firms Locate                                                  Firms choose                                             Firms Play  
                                                                        Their Innovation Level                           Standard Cournot Game 
                                                                                           
 
We define here vertical knowledge spillovers as knowledge spillovers between two 
firms of different stream (Supplier and Producer) via supply chain and can occur 
between two firms located in the same region r  or between two firms of different 
regions t  , but we assume that regional vertical knowledge spillovers are stronger 
than the trans-regional vertical one, so r t  . These exogenous parameters show 
the proportion of innovation efforts of a firm which might be absorbed by 
counterparty. Horizontal knowledge spillovers imply spillovers between two firms of a 
same stream (Two producers or two suppliers) and can happen only when both are 
located in the same region. We denote it with exogenous parameters p for 
producers and s for suppliers ( p s      if exist). Moreover we assume that 
horizontal knowledge spillovers if exist are stronger than vertical one of both types 
since both producers act as same level firms in the same market, 
0 1p st r            (If
p , s or both exists). In this setting zero implies 
occurrence of no spillover and one implies perfect spillovers. Indeed the external 
effect of firm i ‟s innovation effort is to decrease firm j ‟s unit production cost. 
 
Linear inverse demand function is utilized given by P a bQ   ( 1 2Q q q  ) and 
/ 0a b  shows the size of the market.  /Q a b , 0b  . The inverse demand function 
is useful in deriving the total and marginal revenue functions. Total revenue equals 
price P times quantity Q or * ( )*TR P Q a bQ Q   . The marginal revenue function is 
the first derivative of the total revenue function with respect to Q , that is 2MR a bQ 
. The importance of being able to simply calculate MR  is that the profit-maximizing 
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condition for firms regardless of market structure is to produce where marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost MC , that is MR MC . 
 
Our producers as well as our suppliers are supposed to have similar constant unit 
cost of transforming   intermediate goods ,P SC C respectively. By innovation efforts in 
second stage, their unit cost of production is reduced by 
iX  for producers and iY  for 
suppliers. ( 1,2i  )  
 
We assume that intermediate goods are sold by suppliers to producers with constant 
price P , e.g. based on some long-term contractual commitments. 0 PC P a    
 
Therefore, unit cost of production is of the form pPi i i i jC C X Y X P      such that
i i
i
r i
t i
if S and P areinsameregion
if S and P areindifferent regions


  ,  1
1
2
2
0
p
p if P and P are in same region
if P and P are indifferent regions

 

 and
 1
1
2
2
0
s
s if S and S are insame region
if S and S are indifferent regions

 

.        ( , 1,2i j    ; p Pi i i jX Y X P C     ) 
 
Following Qiu (1997), we assume that innovation costs are of the quadratic form
2( ) ( )
ii P i
K X v X , 0
iP
v   for producers and
2( ) ( )
ii S i
K Y v Y , 0
iS
v  for suppliers 
respectively ( 1,2i  ) which implies diminishing returns in R&D. 
 
 
Profit function of the producing firms 1,2i   will have the form of  
    2( )i
i
p
Pi P
p
i i i i j i iva bQ q C X Y X q XP           and for suppliers we have
  2( )i
i
s
Si i i S
s
i j i i iP vq C Y Y X q Y        . 
 
Methodology: Whereas solving final equation systems involves sophisticated 
parametric calculations which make the comparison of final payoff functions almost 
impossible, numerical approach is applied afterwards. Mathematica will be employed 
to depict us the role of each parameter of our model as well as the sensitivity of 
these results upon parametrical changes. 
 
We categorize our parameters into three groups including 1. Market parameters:
, , ,a b P C     2. Knowledge spillovers parameter: , ,r t    and 3. Innovation cost 
parameter:  
 
For the purpose of simplicity we establish three assumptions which we release some 
of them completely or partially afterwards: 
 
Assumption 1: At the first stage of the game -which firms locate- our first producer 
(P1), first supplier (S1) and second supplier (S2) has chosen their location 
exogenously based on the framework of our model in section 3; So we are supposed 
to investigate the location decision of our second producer (P2) in order to answer 
our research question upon geographical concentration. 
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Assumption 2: All parameters are considered to be correspondingly homogeneous. 
Later we release this assumption with respect to innovation‟s cost parameter . 
 
Assumptions 3: Innovation‟s cost of our producers is assumed to be infinity so they 
will not invest on any innovation effort: 0jkPiX  for , , 1,2i j k  . We will relax this 
assumption completely afterwards.  
 
4. Analysis and Findings 
 
In this chapter we analyze our model based on two scenarios which we have 
established on our model regarding the location decision of suppliers. Throughout 
we are going to find out the location decision of our producers and the postulated 
equilibrium. In fact we want to answer this question that under which circumstances 
knowledge spillovers via supply chain lead us to geographical concentration. 
Backward induction will be applied to find the SPE of our three-stage static game 
with perfect information. In each scenario, payoff function of both producers in two 
different cases will be analyzed parametrically; in the first case of each scenario we 
assume that both producers are located in different regions while in the second case 
geographical concentration of producers will be compared.   
  
4.1 First Scenario: Two Suppliers are Located in Different Regions 
 
In this scenario we assume that our suppliers have decided to locate in different 
regions, say R1 and R2. Consequently based on our model horizontal knowledge 
spillover between them will not appear in our calculations. 
 
4.1.1 Case 1: Two Producers are Located in Different Regions     
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
At t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly game with the following payoff 
functions: 
 
2
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q X           
 
2
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q X           
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
r  
r
 
r
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In this notation 
11
1P  is the payoff function of the first producer in the first scenario as 
well as the first case respectively, for example 
12
2P  shows the payoff of the second 
producer in the second case of the first scenario. 
 
Finding out the optimal value of these payoff functions lead us to solving the 
following maximization problem: 
 
11
1
11
1max
P
P
q
 for the first producer and 
11
2
11
2max
P
P
q
  for the second one. 
By F.O.C. we have:  
11
1
11
1
0P
Pq



    and       
11
2
11
2
0P
Pq


  
Nash-Cournot quantities produced by both producers will be reached after some 
simple calculations, 
11 11 11 11
11 1 2 1 2
1
(2 ) 2
3
P r S S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
     

   
11 11 11 11
11 2 1 2 1
2
(2 ) 2
3
P r S S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
     

 
Consequently optimal payoffs of our producers are: 
 
11 11 11 11 2
2
11 11 112 1 2 1
1 1 1
[ (2 ) 2 ]
9
P r S S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P
X
b

 
     
   
 
11 11 11 11 2
2
11 11 111 2 1 2
2 2 2
[ (2 ) 2 ]
9
P r S S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P
X
b

 
     
   
At t=2 firms decide on their innovation level 11PiX  and 
11
SjY as well. ( , 1,2)i j   Payoff 
functions of suppliers are as follow: 
 
2
11 11 11 11 11 11 11
1 1 1 1 1 1 1. ( )S NC S S r P NC S SP q C Y X q Y      
 
 
2
11 11 11 11 11 11 11
2 2 2 2 2 2 2. ( )S NC S S r P NC S SP q C Y X q Y      
 
Optimal innovation level of each firm arises from solving four maximization problems 
strategically as one system; indeed each one is going to maximize its payoff function 
as follow: 
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11
1
11
2
11
1
11
2
11
1
11
2
11
1
11
2
max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y

















  
Subject to four following constraints respectively: 
11 11
1 1
11 11
2 2
11 11
1 1
11 11
2 2
0
0
0
0
P P r S
P P r S
S S r P
S S r P
C X Y P a
C X Y P a
C Y X P
C Y X P




     

    

   
    
 
 
4.1.2 Case 2: Two Producers are Located in Same Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geographical concentration of producers will be investigated by this case. Similarly, 
at t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly game with the following payoff 
functions: 
 
2
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P P Pa bq bq q C X Y X P q X             
 
2
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P P Pa bq bq q C X Y X P q X             
Maximization of these two payoff functions with respect to relevant quantities as we 
did in previous case give us Nash-Cournot quantities as follow: 
12 12 12 12
12 1 2 1 2
1
2 2 (1 )
3
P r S t S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
        
  
12 12 12 12
12 2 1 2 1
2
2 2 (1 )
3
P r S t S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
        
  
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
r  
t  
  
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Thus optimal values of our producers‟ payoff functions are as below: 
 
12 12 12 12 2
2
12 12 121 2 1 2
1 1 1
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
P r S t S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P
X
b
  
 
      
   
 
12 12 12 12 2
2
12 12 122 1 2 1
2 2 2
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
P r S t S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P
X
b
  
 
      
   
Similarly proceeding backward, at t=2 firms decide on their optimal innovation level 
12
PiX  and 
12
SjY as well. ( , 1,2)i j   Payoff functions of suppliers are as follow: 
 
 
2
12 12 12 12 12 12 12
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2
12 12 12 12 12 12 12
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
. ( )
. ( )
S NC S S r P NC S S
S NC S S t P NC S S
P q C Y X q Y
P q C Y X q Y
  
  
    
      
Optimal innovation level of each firm arises from solving four maximization problems 
strategically as one system; indeed each one is going to maximize its payoff function 
as follow: 
12
1
12
2
12
1
12
2
12
1
12
2
12
1
12
2
max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y

















 
With respect to the following four constraints respectively:
 
12 12 12
1 1 2
12 12 12
2 2 1
12 12
1 1
12 12
2 2
0
0
0
0
P P r S P
P P r S P
S S r P
S S r P
C X Y X P a
C X Y X P a
C Y X P
C Y X P
 
 


      

     

   
    
 
4.2 Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are Located in Same Region 
 
Contrary to the first scenario, in the second one whereas our suppliers are located in 
the same region, say R1, horizontal knowledge spillover between them emerges in 
both respective cases depicted with parameter  .  
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4.2.1 Case 1: Two Producers are Located in Different Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applying backward induction, at t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly 
game with the following payoff functions: 
 
2
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( )P P P P P P r S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q X           
 
2
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( )P P P P P P t S P P Pa bq bq q C X Y P q X           
Nash-Cournot quantities are the result of maximization process over these payoff 
functions with respect to 21 21
1 2&P Pq q   respectively: 
21 21 21 21
21 1 2 1 2
1
2 2
3
P r S t S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
      
  
21 21 21 21
21 2 1 2 1
2
2 2
3
P t S r S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
      
  
After plugging these optimal quantities into payoff functions of producers, following 
optimal values of them arise: 
 
21 21 21 21 2
2
21 21 211 2 1 2
1 1 1
[ 2 2 ]
9
P r S t S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P
X
b
 
 
     
   
 
21 21 21 21 2
2
21 21 212 1 2 1
2 2 2
[ 2 2 ]
9
P t S r S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P
X
b
 
 
     
   
Proceeding backward, at t=2 firms decide upon their innovation level 21PiX  and 
21
SjY as 
well. ( , 1,2)i j   Profit functions of our suppliers are as follow: 
 
 
2
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
2
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
. ( )
. ( )
S NC S S r P S NC S S
S NC S S t P S NC S S
P q C Y X Y q Y
P q C Y X Y q Y
   
   
     
     
 
Optimal innovation level of each firm will deduce from maximization of their 
respective payoff functions strategically as a four-equations-four-unknowns system: 
t
 
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
r  

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21
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21
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max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y

















 
With respect to the following four constraints respectively: 
21 21
1 1
21 21
2 2
21 21 21
1 1 2
21 21 21
2 2 1
0
0
0
0
P P r S
P P t S
S S r P S
S S t P S
C X Y P a
C X Y P a
C Y X Y P
C Y X Y P


 
 
     

    

    
     
 
 
4.2.2 Case 2: Two Producers are Located in Same Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geographical concentration of producers in the second scenario will be investigated 
via this case. Incidentally horizontal knowledge spillovers between two producers as 
well as two suppliers exist in this case which induce flow of knowledge through our 
four firms depicted by parameters ,r  . 
By using backward induction, at t=3 producers play a standard Cournot duopoly 
game with the below mention payoff functions: 
 
 
2
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
2
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
P P P P P P r S P P P P
P P P P P P r S P P P P
a bq bq q C X Y X P q X
a bq bq q C X Y X P q X
   
   
        
        
 
By solving First-Order-Condition equations of both producers as a one system, 
maximum Nash-Cournot value of our quantities have the following form: 

 
S1 S2 
P1 P2 
R1 R2 
r  r  

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22 22 22 22
22 1 2 1 2
1
22 22 22 22
22 2 1 2 1
2
2 2 (1 )
3
2 2 (1 )
3
P r S r S P P
NC
P r S r S P P
NC
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
a C Y Y X X P
q
b
  
  
      

      

  
Consequently optimal payoff functions of our producers are as follow: 
 
 
22 22 22 22 2
2
22 22 221 2 1 2
1 1 1
22 22 22 22 2
2
22 22 222 1 2 1
2 2 2
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
[ 2 2 (1 ) ]
9
P r S r S P P
P P P
P r S r S P P
P P P
a C Y Y X X P
X
b
a C Y Y X X P
X
b
  
 
  
 


      
 
      
 
 
Proceeding backward, at t=2 firms decide on their innovation level 22
PiX  and 
22
SjY as 
well. ( , 1,2)i j   Payoff functions of suppliers are as follow: 
 
 
2
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
2
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
. ( )
. ( )
S NC S S r P S NC S S
S NC S S r P S NC S S
P q C Y X Y q Y
P q C Y X Y q Y
   
   
     
     
 
Similar to our previous cases, optimal level of innovation of our firms will be resulted 
by strategically solving a four-equations-four-unknowns system of equations as 
follow: 
22
1
22
2
22
1
22
2
22
1
22
2
22
1
22
2
max
max
max
max
P
P
S
S
P
X
P
X
S
Y
S
Y

















    
Providing the satisfaction of the four below mention constraints respectively: 
22 22 22
1 1 2
22 22 22
2 2 1
22 22 22
1 1 2
22 22 22
2 2 1
0
0
0
0
P P r S P
P P r S P
S S r P S
S S r P S
C X Y X P a
C X Y X P a
C Y X Y P
C Y X Y P
 
 
 
 
      

     

    
     
 
 
4.3 Findings 
 
4.3.1 Producers Do NOT Invest on any Innovation Effort 
 
In the first phase of our analysis for the purpose of simplicity and based on 
assumption 3, we ignore any innovation effort of our both producers. Obviously with 
this assumption in hand horizontal knowledge spillovers between producers will not 
occur. We will relax this assumption for broader analysis later.  
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Observation 1: In the first scenario and in the absence of innovation efforts of both 
producers, the first case which shows the geographical isolation is the equilibrium. 
 
As we have established in the first scenario both suppliers are located in different 
regions and consequently there is no horizontal knowledge spillover between them. 
As a result the only channel of innovation‟s disclosure is through vertical knowledge 
spillovers characterized by parameters &r t  which 0 1t r    . Comparison 
between two cases of this scenario shows us that the second producer will find it 
more profitable locating itself in the different region in order to obtain innovation effort 
of its respective supplier via regional -rather than trans regional- vertical knowledge 
spillover which will decline its costs more. Obviously the fist producer will prefer the 
second case over the first one. Because he will compete with a producer who could 
reduce his costs with the factor t r  , but it is not equilibrium while second producer 
will tend to deviate to the first case and locate in different region. 
 
More precisely speaking, we can consider following graphs showed in figure 4.3.1.1 
which help us to compare the payoffs of producers in these cases. As depicted in 
this set of graphs, the first producer clearly prefers the occurrence of second case in 
which he will obtain more profit from the market while the second producers 
dominantly prefers the first case getting more payoffs. Suppliers have the same 
behavior symmetrically. 
 
Observation 2: In the second scenario and in the absence of innovation efforts of 
both producers, the second case which shows the geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium. 
 
In this scenario horizontal knowledge spillovers between two suppliers which is 
characterized by , exist. Similar to the interpretation of the previous observation, in 
this scenario our second producer dominantly prefers geographical concentration 
which depicted in the second case. Consequently he is able to reduce his costs 
based on the knowledge spillovers factor r t  which will not be in the favor of first 
producer who prefers to be alone in the first region as depicted in the first case. But 
based on assumption 1 second case of this scenario would be the equilibrium. 
Although locating of both suppliers is exogenous, their behavior can be interpreted 
similarly. On the other hand first producer prefers first case in which his competitor is 
able to share his knowledge with second supplier via trans-regional vertical 
knowledge spillover that is smaller than regional one. 
 
Figure 4.3.1.2 exhibits the comparison of payoffs of our economic agents in two 
different cases of this scenario which support above mentioned reasoning.  
When R&D efforts of both producers were ignored as we did in this subsection, our 
observations show strong robustness upon parametrical changes. Broad ranges of 
parameters have been checked numerically in this part in order to guarantee the final 
results.  
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Figure 4.3.1.1:  
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions (Yellow: Case1 
& Red: Case2) 
                                             
1 2 1
( 100, 2, 0.05, 0.2, 0.7)t P P Sa b             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1.2:  
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region (Green: Case1 & 
Blue: Case2) 
                                             
1 2 1
( 100, 2, 0.05, 0.2, 0.7)t P P Sa b             
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4.3.2 Producers Enter Innovation Efforts 
 
In this section we relax assumption 3 and consider the innovation efforts of both 
producers in our analysis. Obviously in this situation horizontal knowledge spillovers 
between two producers which characterized by   will play an important role affecting 
final outcomes. Furthermore based on assumption 2, horizontal knowledge spillovers 
between two suppliers as well as two producers are assumed to be homogeneous, 
that is
suppliers producers    . 
 
In the previous section 4.3.1 the results were completely robust with respect to 
postulated parameters which categorized in section 3 and no deviation from our 
mentioned equilibrium occurred during numerical analysis and parametric changes, 
but in this section we examine the robustness and sustainability of our observations 
according to categorization of our parameters.  
 
Observation 3: In the first scenario and in the presence of innovation efforts of both 
producers, the second case which shows the geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium. 
Observation 4: In the second scenario and in the presence of innovation efforts of 
both producers, the second case which shows the geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium. 
 
4.3.2.1 Comparative Static 
 
In order to realize the effect of each parameter on our outcomes, and supporting the 
robustness of observations 3 and 4, we investigate comparative static in this 
subsection. For this purpose two sets of parameters –based on our categorization in 
section 3 - are being fixed and the parametrical effects of the third set are being 
analyzed. Broad ranges of parameters have been checked in order to ensure us 
about robustness of our observation upon parametrical changes, but some limited 
examples could be mentioned here.  
 
4.3.2.1.1 Market Parameters 
 
Providing other parameters are supposed to be fixed, we investigate the effect of our 
market parameters which characterized by , , ,a b P C on equilibria and location 
decision of our agents. Utilizing numerical approach we consider the impact of 
altering the market parameters on equilibrium expressed in observations 3 and 4.  
In the first scenario as depicted in figures 4.3.2.1.1.1 and 4.3.2.1.1.2 second 
producer prefers second case over the first one implying geographical concentration. 
Altering the size of the market as well as the unit cost of production and price does 
not affect the location decision of our producers.  
 
Altering the size of the market indeed just affect the profit value of agents 
proportionally and has not any effect on location decision of them. Actually paying 
attention to „Markup‟ index of agents in this model clarifies this matter more. In fact 
any reduction in the size of the market will decline the quantity produced by our 
agents which cause them to decrease innovation efforts in order to reach marginal 
profits in the market. Contrary is valid when market size goes up, but whereas our 
agents doing business in the same market, these changes affect all proportionally.  
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Similar interpretations could be applied for the second scenario in which all agents 
dominantly prefer clustering structure over the first case. Figures 4.3.2.1.1.3 and 
4.3.2.1.1.4 confirm our claim.  
 
Comprehensive parametric analysis has been done in this subsection to ensure us 
upon robustness of observations including broad range of reservation price, market 
size, unit cost of transforming intermediate goods C  and different value of 
intermediate good‟s price P . 
 
4.3.2.1.2 Knowledge Spillover Parameters 
 
For the sake of more accurate analysis we arrange a relation between knowledge 
spillover parameters based on the framework of our model, in which we have 
assumed that 0 1t r      . Hence we suppose that r t    such that 1 
and 0 1  . 
In the first scenario second producer would be able to decline its costs from two 
source of knowledge, its relevant supplier in the different region as well as the first 
producer in the same region with knowledge spillover factors t and respectively. 
Numerical analysis shows that the effect of these two factors is more than the effect 
of regional vertical knowledge spillover factor r alone. Figures 4.3.2.1.2.1 – 
4.3.2.1.2.3 exhibit the different selection of knowledge spillover parameters subject 
to holding the other parameters fixed. Moreover as depicted in these figures the first 
producer also prefers second case over the first one which demonstrate his 
tendency to geographical concentration in which he is able to obtain knowledge from 
two sources with the factors r and while his competitor will lose some customers of 
the common market because of higher costs of production. Thus although the 
second producer will obtain lower payoff than his competitor he will locate himself 
near him in order to exploit his innovation efforts which would create better outcome 
for both of them. 
 
The behavior of our suppliers is a little bit more interesting. The first supplier 
dominantly prefers the second case over the first one in which he will always have 
competitive advantage over his rival. He obtains cost-reducing knowledge with two 
factors r and while his competitor just can do it via t and . Our respected figures 
depict that clearly, but in figure 4.3.2.1.2.3 where we have no explicit difference 
between knowledge spillover parameters , ,r t   the second producer will also reach 
more profit in the second case. Consequently our second supplier prefers the 
symmetric structure of first case when the amount of our knowledge spillover factors 
is meaningfully different.     
 
In the second scenario all of our agents do agree to compete and collaborate with 
each other in a cluster, so geographical concentration would be dominantly preferred 
by them. If second producer chooses the isolated region, directly he could be able 
just to obtain the knowledge via his relevant supplier with the parameter t . Moreover 
he will lose the chance to exchange his knowledge with his competitor in the market. 
When second producer were a stronger innovative firm in the market with higher 
technology level, this kind of isolation decision might mean more, but in this section 
based on assumption 2 we have assumed that innovation costs is similar between all 
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agents. We will relax this assumption later. This equilibrium shows strong robustness 
upon changing the parameters.  
 
4.3.2.1.3 Innovation Cost Parameter 
 
The last group of parameter which we are going to analyze is innovation cost 
characterized by   and assumed to be homogenous. We will investigate the 
heterogeneity of this parameter which means different technological level between 
our agents in the next section. 
Following Qiu (1997) we have assumed that innovation cost are of the form
2( ) ( )jk jkPi PiK X v X , 0v  and , , 1,2i j k   for producers as well as
2( ) ( )jk jkSi SiK Y v Y , 0v 
and , , 1,2i j k  for suppliers which implies diminishing returns in R&D.  
Figure 4.3.2.1.3.1 depicts that in the first scenario if innovation cost is altered 
homogenously second producer prefers geographical concentration over isolation 
which is also a preferred situation for the first producer and supplier and our second 
supplier is somewhat indifferent between two cases.  
Providing innovation cost assumed to be homogenous, any increase in this cost 
enforces our agents to decline R&D efforts which decline their final profit 
proportionally, but does not affect location decision of them. Inversely high 
technological firms with lower level of innovation cost will do more R&D activities 
which decline their total costs and consequently increase the final payoff.  
Similarly as depicted in figure 4.3.2.1.3.2 in the second scenario all agents prefer to 
compete and collaborate with each other in the same geographical region. 
 
Figure 4.3.2.1.1.1: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with a=100, b=2 
(Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
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i ir t P S
        
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 Figure 4.3.2.1.1.2: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with a=40, b=2 
(Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2.1.1.3: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with a=100, b=2 
(Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
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Figure 4.3.2.1.1.4: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with a=40, b=2 
(Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2.1.2.1: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 
2, 0.5    (Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
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Figure 4.3.2.1.2.2: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 
1.1, 0.9    (Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2.1.2.3: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 
5, 0.33    (Orange: Case1 & Black: Case2) 
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Figure 4.3.2.1.2.4: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 2, 0.5    
(Green: Case1 & Red: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2.1.2.5: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 
1.1, 0.9    (Black: Case1 & Blue: Case2) 
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Figure 4.3.2.1.2.6: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 5, 0.33    
(Orange: Case1 & Black: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.2.1.3.1: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions (Green: Case1 & 
Red: Case2) 
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Figure 4.3.2.1.3.2: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region (Green: Case1 & 
Red: Case2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Heterogeneity of Innovation Cost 
 
So far we assumed that technological level of our four agents is similar and 
characterized by homogeneous innovation cost, but in this section we relax 
assumption 2 partially and investigate the effect of heterogeneous innovation cost on 
location decision of firms. In fact we move one step toward real world businesses in 
which companies actually act with different technological level and there are some 
evidences that these differences can affect the location decision of firms as well. A 
prominent example in this regard is Microsoft, which became the industry leader 
after locating in Seattle, which at the time was not a centre for software development 
(Almazan 2007). For this purpose we consider two different scenarios which may 
exist and analyze the model accordingly.  
 
4.3.3.1 Innovation Cost is Heterogeneous just among Different Producer-
Supplier Pair  
 
In this subsection we suppose that homogenous innovation cost imposes to first 
supplier and his respected producer in supply chain as well as the second supplier-
producer set while we have heterogeneity of innovation cost among these both pairs. 
So we normalize the innovation cost of second producer and his respected supplier 
to one while vary the innovation cost of first pair over an interval 0.5,5 . The reason 
of choosing this interval is that innovation costs which are less than half will not 
( 100, 2, 30, 20, 0.1, 0.05, 0.2)r ta b P C         
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satisfy our constraints in optimization problem and amounts more than 5 will decline 
R&D efforts of firms dramatically such that the impact of knowledge spillovers goes 
down.  
 
Observation 5: In the first scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.1, 
when
1 1P S
    , second case which shows geographical concentration is the 
equilibrium, while with
1 1P S
    , first case which shows geographical isolation is 
the equilibrium such that the exact amount of   depends on the value of our 
parameters. 
 
In the first scenario for our first pair of producer-supplier is always of preference to 
act within concentration structure because regardless of the technological level of 
both pair, they obtain knowledge via  which reduce their cost and increase their final 
outcome. On the other hand our second pair alters his location decision based on 
the level of technological differences, that is our second producer when encounter a 
technological level  times higher than his respected rival will find it more profitable 
to keep his physical distance from him and act in isolation as depicted in the first 
case to avoid any horizontal information disclosure. Figure 4.3.3.1.1 demonstrates 
the schematic results in which 1.8  . 
 
Observation 6: In the Second scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.1, 
second case which shows geographical concentration is the equilibrium. 
Here our second producer dominantly prefers geographical concentration which 
enables him to receive knowledge from other agents with higher disclosure rate.  
Figure 4.3.3.1.2 depicts the result. 
 
4.3.3.2 Heterogeneous Innovation Cost Imposes just on Second Producer 
 
Now we investigate whether a very high-tech firm, that is here our second producer, 
with low innovation cost choose isolation structure to keep its knowledge capital or 
not. Hence, homogeneous innovation cost for first producer and both suppliers has 
been set to five and we change the innovation cost of second producer over the 
interval  0.5,0.7 parametrically. In fact by setting the innovation cost of other agents 
to a big value like five, we treat them as low technological level firms. On the other 
hand we change the innovation cost of our second producer over the interval 
 0.5,0.7 which implies higher technological level in comparison with other agents.For 
the sake of more accurate results we consider two different levels of horizontal 
knowledge spillover 0.2  and 0.12  to be more sensitive on the effect of 
innovation cost. Indeed by choosing 0.12  rather than 0.2   we try to investigate 
the situation of more outward knowledge spillovers‟ protection. 
 
Observation 7: In the first scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.2, first 
case is weakly preferred by the second producer which resulted geographical 
isolation as equilibrium. 
Here our second producer weakly prefers to locate himself far from first producer in 
order to avoid leakage of information to his rival. Although the results are not strong 
here and when innovation cost of second producer tend to 0.7 we face some kind of 
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indifference behavior, but dominant preference of second supplier who really makes 
profit by being alone with his customer might cause some agreements in the real 
world which commit our first producer to stay in isolation. Figures 4.3.3.2.1 and 
4.3.3.2.3 show the graphs for 0.2   and 0.12  , and the result is robust upon 
parametrical changes. 
 
Observation 8: In the Second scenario considering conditions of subsection 4.3.3.2, 
second case which shows geographical concentration is the equilibrium. 
 
Although our second producer is more high-tech against other agents but he prefers 
to stay in concentration structure to benefit from disclosure of knowledge, but our 
numerical analysis show a weak preferences in this situation. Clearly other agents 
appreciate his presence near them. 
 
Figure 4.3.3.2.2 and 4.3.3.2.4 exhibit the results for 0.2   and 0.12  respectively, 
and the result is completely robust upon parametrical changes. 
 
Figure 4.3.3.1.1: 
 First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions (Black: Case 1 
& Blue: Case 2) 
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Figure 4.3.3.1.2: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region (Black: Case 1 & 
Blue: Case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.3.2.1: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 0.2   
(Green: Case 1 & Red: Case 2) 
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Figure 4.3.3.2.2: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 0.2   
(Green: Case 1 & Red: Case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.3.2.3: 
First Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Different Regions with 0.12   
(Black: Case 1 & Blue: Case 2) 
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Figure 4.3.3.2.4: 
Second Scenario: Two Suppliers are located in Same Region with 0.12   
(Black: Case 1 & Blue: Case 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Knowledge as a source of competitive advantage plays a vital role in nowadays 
business affairs such that in many cases affects the location decision of firms 
directly. Particularly, when we consider the location decision of innovative 
technology-based companies, the issue becomes more significant. 
  
In this research we tried to answer the question that under which circumstances 
vertical knowledge spillover via supply chain lead us to geographical concentration 
which Porter (1998) named it cluster. 
 
For this purpose a three-stage game theoretic model based on the inspiration of 
existing model in the literature of innovation, knowledge spillovers and economic 
geography has been established to empower us analyzing the subject more 
accurate. In our model we distinguished vertical knowledge spillover which occurs 
between a producer and its respected supplier from horizontal one happening 
between two firms of the same stream of the market. Moreover different 
technological level of our players was analyzed separately. Numerical approach with 
the utilization of Mathematica is applied to solve our strategic optimization problem. 
 
Results show that based on the selected values of parameters, imposed 
assumptions, and designed scenarios, different location decision might be made in 
1 1 2
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which firms act within clusters or isolation. Observations 1-8 express the results 
which have been supported by graphs induced from our programming. Because of 
having reliability on our observations, broad ranges of parameters have been 
examined in order to guarantee the robustness of equilibrium outcomes.  
 
A main limitation of this paper which leads the research to enter numerical analysis 
was the mathematically complicated nature of final equations. This made the 
comparison between different scenarios completely intractable. Another limitation 
was the number of scenarios that we have considered that is more probable 
scenarios could enrich the results. 
 
Finally it might be useful to mention that different approaches can be applied to 
extend this work. Altering or relaxing each of our established assumptions in section 
3 would open a new door, e.g. specific designed scenarios upon disposal of our 
supplier, assuming exogenous knowledge spillovers, can be developed. Moreover 
we have assumed that each producer is able just to provide his intermediate goods 
from his respected supplier and also each supplier can sell it only to his respected 
producer which would be an appropriate aspect of extension. 
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